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Nontechnical Summary
From 1 January 2005 onwards the European Union has launched the first large-scale international emissions trading program. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) in principle has the opportunity to advance the role of market-based policies in environmental regulation and to form the basis for future European and international climate policies.
The EU-ETS under the European Burden Sharing Agreement implies a hybrid regulation scheme as sectors of domestic economies that are not covered by the emissions trading scheme require complementary emission regulation. Under such a hybrid scheme, the domestic regulator must have perfect information on the international price of tradable emission allowances as well as the emission abatement possibilities across all domestic emission sources in order to implement a cost-minimizing abatement policy.
In this paper, we demonstrate that a lack of central planner information may seriously limit the efficiency of hybrid regulation. The deficiency of hybrid regulation becomes particularly policy-relevant when the distributional constraints for the design of the EU-ETS are taken into account. In fact, the EU-ETS has been only approved by EU Member States under the condition that emission allowances to sectors covered by the trading scheme are handed out for free. Whereas lump-sum grandfathering of allowances would not interfere with overall efficiency in a single comprehensive emission market, this is no longer the case with hybrid markets. Numerical simulations based on empirical data for Germany illustrate impending large efficiency losses if allowance allocation to EU-ETS sectors exceeds the efficient level. simulations for Germany, we illustrate the efficiency drawback of hybrid carbon regulation which becomes particularly relevant when distributional constraints of the current EU-ETS design are taken into account.
The Efficiency Costs of Separating

Introduction
Since long, economists have advocated the efficiency advantages of market-based instruments,
i.e., emission taxes or tradable emission allowances over command-and-control standards. The basic reasoning behind this is that taxes or tradable allowances can achieve the same marginal costs for each use of a given pollutant so that the economy as a whole will employ the cheapest abatement options. While a deliberate design of standards could in principle also achieve costeffective abatement, the fundamental advantage of market-based regulation is that costefficiency can be obtained by decentralized market mechanisms: There are no information requirements for the regulator on the specific abatement options across different pollution sources to assure equalization of marginal abatement costs.
During the last decade, in particular emission taxes have played a growing role in domestic environmental policies of OECD countries -not at least because efficiency arguments promoted overall political feasibility (OECD 2001 Initially, the EU-ETS will only cover carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from selected energyintensive sectors including: production and processing of iron and steel; production of cement, glass, or ceramic; energy transformation (electricity generation and oil refineries). According to Article 10 of the EU-ETS-Directive, emission allowances to these sectors will be grandfathered, i.e. given for free. In this paper, we investigate the potential efficiency costs of hybrid carbon emission regulation. We start with a simple analytical partial equilibrium framework to demonstrate the fundamental problem of hybrid regulation. We then quantify the excess costs of hybrid regulation for Germany using marginal carbon abatement cost curves based on empirical data.
Our analysis complements recent research on the economic impacts of the EU-ETS that emphasized the distortionary effects of dynamic (updating) allocation rules (see e.g. Böhringer and Lange 2005a) or competitive distortions between similar energy-intensive firms across EU Member States (see e.g. Böhringer and Lange 2005b) . This paper highlights the fundamental information problems and induced efficiency costs of hybrid carbon regulation from the perspective of national authorities.
Stylized Analysis
Under the EU-BSA, a Member State must comply with a country-specific emissions budget E .
With international emissions trading, efficient national regulation comes down to minimizing compliance costs as the sum of abatement costs C i (e i ) across all domestic sectors i and the costs of buying emission allowances from the international market at an exogenous price p :
The associated first-order condition states that marginal abatement costs are equalized across all sectors at the international emissions price: 
Numerical Model and Parameterization
In order to provide empirical estimates for the magnitude of efficiency losses induced by hybrid carbon regulation, we transform our stylized analytical framework into a simple numerical model based on marginal abatement cost curves for Germany.
These curves represent the marginal costs of reducing carbon emissions by different amounts within a sector. Marginal costs of abatement may vary across sectors due to differences in carbon intensity, initial energy price levels, or the ease of carbon substitution possibilities.
For the empirical specification of sector-specific marginal abatement costs curves we adopt a flexible polynomial function of third degree: 5 Table 1 provides a summary of least-square estimates for the coefficients of marginal abatement cost curves for DIR and NDIR sectors in Germany. Table 2 summarizes the evolution of emissions and emission reduction requirements for Germany vis-à-vis the EU average based on most recent business-as-usual projections by the EU (EU 2003b). 5 We perform a series of model calculations with stepwise increases in sectoral emissions constraints for Germany which deliver pairs of emission abatement and associated marginal abatement costs used subsequently as input for the least-square approximation of continuous marginal abatement cost curves. In order to illustrate the excess costs for hybrid carbon regulation, we plot Germany's compliance costs as a function of the international CO 2 price and the domestic fulfillment factor λ . The latter has been a central parameter of negotiations between the national regulatory authorities and the DIR sectors covered by the EU-ETS. Obviously, the DIR sectors had a strong incentive to lobby for large fulfillment factors in order to reduce effective reduction requirements vis-à-vis their business-as-usual emissions. A review of NAPs that have been approved so far by the EU Commission indicates rather generous allocation of emission allowances to the DIR sectors with λ being close or even beyond 1 (Gilbert et al. 2004 ). As to Germany, the fulfillment factor is 1, i.e., the DIR sectors are more or less endowed with their business-as-usual emissions.
Scenarios and Results
Figure 2 provides a contour plot of total compliance costs for Germany across a meaningful range of international CO 2 prices and fulfillment factors: (i) Reflecting broad consensus of carbon market analysts, international CO 2 prices will not exceed 20 € per ton of CO 2 in the initial phase of the EU-ETS, and (ii) fulfillment factors for Germany range between 0.8 and 1 6 We apply the EU Burden Sharing Agreement covering all greenhouse gases to CO 2 only which is by far the most important greenhouse gas within the EU. 7 The major source for the decrease in emissions since 1990 can be traced back to so-called wall-fall profits in the context of Germany's reunification with a sharp decline in East-Germany's emissionintensive production together with more efficient energy transformation utilities.
covering efficient fulfillment factors (as an endogenous function of the international CO 2 price) as well as the negotiated fulfillment factor of 1. The marked solid line in Figure 2 reports the minimal compliance costs for Germany given alternative international CO 2 prices p and the associated efficient choice * λ of the fulfillment factor. At a given international CO 2 price, compliance costs become the higher, the more the national authority deviates from the efficient fulfillment factor -this explains the U-shaped hull around the minimum cost line. Total excess costs of sub-optimal choices for λ emerge as the difference between compliance costs for the respective λ and the minimum costs for * λ .
Total compliance costs are composed of direct abatement costs for all sectors and the value of emission allowances that can be traded via the DIR sectors. Whenever λ deviates from * λ the marginal abatement costs in NDIR sectors are no longer equalized with marginal abatement costs in DIR sectors -the latter always coinciding with the international emissions price p. If λ is higher than * λ , which is actually the case for Germany over the whole selected range of international emissions prices, the effective reduction burden for NDIR sectors becomes more stringent leading to higher marginal abatement costs than p and an increase in NDIR compliance costs. While the DIR sectors gain and may even achieve substantial net revenues from carbon exports, total compliance costs for DIR and NDIR sectors go up.
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Figures 3 and 4 decompose the total compliance costs into the components for NDIR and DIR sectors. In both figures, the minimum cost line for efficient NAPs is marked. Compliance costs for NDIR sectors are equal to the sum of direct abatement costs across these sectors, whereas compliance costs for DIR sectors in addition include the value of exported or imported CO 2 allowances. The shape of NDIR compliance costs is straightforward: Independent of the international allowance price, abatement costs of NDIR sectors are determined by the effective reduction requirement associated with the choice of λ . We can see that NDIR compliance costs sharply increase in λ , thereby reflecting empirical evidence on costly abatement options in important segments of the domestic economy such as traffic and transportation that are not covered by the EU-ETS. In turn, compliance costs in DIR sectors at a given international price decrease in λ rendering negative costs (or likewise net revenues) via permit exports if free allowance allocation is sufficiently high.
The value of allowance trade is illustrated in Figure 5 . Whenever this value drops to zero, the associated fulfillment factor λ characterizes an autarky situation for the given international emissions price p. 8 The same logic applies, if λ was lower than * λ : Here the marginal abatement costs for NDIR sectors drop below p, thereby reducing NDIR compliance costs at the expense of diminishing gains from emissions trading for the DIR sectors. The decomposition of compliance costs for DIR and NDIR sectors not only provides useful information on the sources of excess costs from hybrid regulation but also de-masks an important equity dimension: A generous allocation of free emission allowances to DIR sectors may fully shift the burden of emission reduction under the EU-BSA to the NDIR sectors (see Böhringer at al. 2005) whereas DIR sectors may be better off compared to business-as-usual. Our graphical exposition does not only visualize the excess costs and distributional impacts of inefficient choices for λ , it also illustrates the impending excess costs of hybrid regulation due to the lack of central planner information: Differences between various points on the minimum cost line provide information on the excess costs of hybrid carbon regulation when the national regulatory assumes the "wrong" international emissions price for pursued efficient partitioning of the national emissions budget. If, e.g., the national regulator expects an international CO 2 price at 10 € per ton of CO 2 and the "real" market price should materialize at 15 € per ton of CO 2 , the implied excess costs amounts to 23.6 € 2002 which constitutes a cost premium of 8.9 % above the central planner's minimum costs.
Conclusions
From 1 In this paper, we have highlighted a central pitfall of the current EU-ETS that could seriously limit its efficiency thereby weakening arguments for a market-based regulation course. The EU-ETS under the European Burden Sharing Agreement implies a hybrid regulation scheme as sectors of domestic economies that are not covered by the emissions trading scheme require complementary emission regulation. Under a hybrid scheme, the domestic regulator must have perfect information on the international emissions price as well as the (marginal) abatement cost curves across all domestic emission sources in order to implement the single costminimizing abatement policy. Therefore, the current EU policy design for emission abatement discards a central element of market-based regulation, i.e. decentralized markets that autonomously achieve efficient use of scarce resources.
The pitfall of hybrid regulation becomes particularly policy-relevant when we account for distributional constraints. As a matter of fact, the EU-ETS has been only approved by EU Member States under the condition that emission allowances to sectors covered by the trading scheme are handed out for free. Whereas lump-sum grandfathering of allowances would not interfere with overall efficiency in a single comprehensive emission market, this is no longer the case with hybrid markets. Our numerical simulations based on empirical data for Germany have illustrated the impending large excess costs of hybrid regulation if allowance allocation to EU-ETS sectors deviates from the efficient level.
The deficiency of current EU emission regulation, however, should not be construed as an argument against emissions trading or market-based instruments per se. The problems arise from hybrid regulation that creates separate emission markets. As a consequence, the EU-ETS should be expanded in the future to include all domestic sectors of EU economies thereby creating a single emission market. cutback(r,"1990") = eu_bsa(r); cutback(r,"%year%") = ROUND(100*(1 -( (1-cutback(r,"1990")/100)*carbonstat(r,"C_90","Total")) /carbonstat(r,"C_%year%","Total")),1);
OPTION cutback:1:1:1; DISPLAY cutback; PARAMETER target(*,*) Effective carbon emission reduction requirement in Mtons of carbon; * For initialisation, assign uniform reduction requirements across all sectors target(i,r)= carbonstat(r,"C_%year%",i) *
(1-carbonstat(r,"C_90","Total")*(1-cutback(r,"1990")/100)/ carbonstat(r,"C_%year%","Total")) * Assignment of MAC curve coefficients * Approximations of MACs: MAC = a1*e + a2*e**2 + a3*e**3 PARAMETER a1, a2, a3; * MAC approximation is based on 1997 GTAP5-data a1(i,r) =mac_coef(r,"97",i,"a1"); a2(i,r) =mac_coef(r,"97",i,"a2"); a3(i,r) =mac_coef(r,"97",i,"a3");
